Rhoades v. State Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 34198 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-7-2008
Rhoades v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34198
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"Rhoades v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34198" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 227.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/227
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) NOS. 34198134199 
) 
VS. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. 1 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
HONORABLE RON SCHILLING 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
RESPONDENT 
OLIVER W. LOEWY 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
317 West 6'h Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, ID 83843 
DENNIS BENJAMIN 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701-2772 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PETITIONER-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
... 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. 111 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case ................................................................................. 1 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The 
Underlying Criminal Proceedings ..... ......................................... 1 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's 
First Post-Conviction Case .....................  .............................................. 4 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's 
Second Post-Conviction Case ....................................... . ................................... 5 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's 
Rule 60(b) Motion .............................................................................................. 7 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's 
Third Post-Conviction Case ... . . .. ..... .. . .. . .... ... .. .. . . .. ... . ... . ... . .... .. ... . ..... ... ................ 7 
ISSUE ................................................................................................. ......................... 9 
ARGUMENT .. .. .... ... .. ... .... . .. ... ...... . .. . .. .. . ... .... .. ... .. ... .. .. . . . . . .. . .... ... .... . .. ... . .... . . .. .. .. .... ... .. . . I0 
The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Grant 
Stuart Post-Conviction Relief Because I.C. 5 19-271 9 
Does Not Grant The Courts Jurisdiction To Retroactively 
Apply New Rules Of Law In Cases On Collateral Review ............................. 10 
A. Introduction ........................................................................................ 10 
B. Standard Of Review ............................................................................. 11 
C. Stuart's Successive Post-Conviction Petition Is 
Governed By I.C. 5 19-2719 ............................................................. 11 
D. Because The Claims In His Successive Petition Do Not 
Fall Within The Exception Contained In I.C. 
5 19-2719(5), Stuart's Appeal Must Be Dismissed ............................. 15 
E. The Legislature Has Stated Its Clear Intent That 
I.C. 5 19-271 9(5) Be Applied Retroactively In Capital Cases ............ 19 
F. Stuart Has Failed To Establish I.C. 5 19-2719 Violates 
Either The State Or Federal Constitutions .......................................... 20 
1. I.C. § 19-2719 Does Not Violate The 
Idaho Constitution's Separation Of 
Powers Doctrine ....................................................................... 20 
2. Idaho Code 5 19-271 9(5) Does Not Violate 
.............................................................. Ex Post Facto Laws 22 
3. Idaho Code 5 19-2719(5) Does Not Violate 
.................... Stuart's Due Process Or Equal Protection Rights 25 
G. Because The Claims In His Successive Petition Seek 
The Retroactive Application Of A New Rule Of Law 
In Violation Of LC. § 19-27 19(5)(c), Stuart's Appeal 
Must Be Dismissed ..................................... ....................................... 26 
H. Stuart Is Precluded From Challenging The Validity Of 
His Conviction Or Sentence Via A Writ Of Habeas Corpus ............... 27 
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 28 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................... 29 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Booth v . Maryland. 482 U.S. 496 (1987) ......................................................................... 18 
Butler v . State. 129 Idaho 899. 935 P.2d 162 (1997) .................................................. 18. 19 
Calder v . Bull. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) ..................................................................... 22 
Card v . Idaho. --- U.S. ---. 128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008) .......................................................... 8 
Collins v . Yomgblood. 497 U.S. 37 (1990) ............................................................... 23 24 
Creech v . State. 137 Idaho 573. 51 P.3d 387 (2002) ......................  ..................... 11. 15 
Danforth v . Minnesota. ... U.S. .., 128 S.Ct. 1029 (2008) ......................................... 8. 10 
Dionne v . State, 93 Idaho 235, 459 P.2d 1017 (1969) ...................................................... 21 
Dobbert v . Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) ........................................................... 22, 24, 25 
Esauivel v . State, 128 Idaho 390, 91 3 P.2d 1 160 (Ct . App . 1996) ................................... 24 
Fetterly v . State, 121 Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991) ............................................ passim 
Fields v . State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000) ............................................. 12, 15 
Griffith v . Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) ................................................... 10, 17, 18, 19 
Hairston v . Idaho, ... U.S. ., 128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008) ............................................ 8, 11, 26 
Hairston v . State, 144 Idaho 51, 156 P.3d 552 (2007) ........................................... 11, 26 
...... Hoffman v . State, 142 Idaho 27, 121 P.3d 958 (2005) ............................... . 8, 10, 15 
Johnson v . Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) ........................................................... 14 
................. Kirkland v . Blaine Comtv Medical Ctr., 134 Idaho 464, 4 P.3d 1 1 15 (2000) 21 
LaFon v . State, 119 Idaho 387, 807 P.2d 66 (Ct . App . 1991) ......................................... 24 
Lankford v . State, 127 Idaho 100, 897 P.2d 991 (1995) ............................................. 15, 26 
Libby v . Magnusson, 177 F.3d 43 (1'' Cir . 1999) ........................................................... 25 
Linkletter v . Walker. 381 U.S. 618 (1965) .....................  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10. 16. 17. 18 
Lvnce v . Mathis. 5 19 U.S. 433 (1 997) .............................................................................. 22
Mahaffey v . State. 87 Idaho 228. 392 P.2d 279 (1964) .................................................... 21 
Matthews v . State. 122 Idaho 801. 839 P.2d 1215 (1992) ......................................... 19 
McKinney v . Idaho. --- U.S. ---. 128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008) .................................................... 8 
McKinnev v . State. 133 Idaho 695. 992 P.2d 144 (1999) .............................. 11. 12. 13. 15 
Mellinger v . State. 113 Idaho 31. 740 P.2d 73 (Ct . App . 1987) ....................................... 24 
Mitchell v . State. 934 P.2d 346 (Okla . Crim . App . 1997) .......................................... 25 
Murch v . Mottram. 409 U.S. 41 (1972) ..................................................................... 13. 14 
th Neellev v . Nagle. 138 F.3d 917 (1 1 Cir . 1998) .............................................................. 25
Paradis v . State. 128 Idaho 223. 91 2 P.2d 1 10 (1 996) ................................................ 15. 24 
Pavne v . Tennessee. 501 U.S. 808 (1991) ..................................................................... 18 
Paz v . State. 1 18 Idaho 542. 798 P.2d 1 (1990) ............................................................. 26 
Paz v . State. 123 Idaho 758. 852 P.2d 1355 (1993) .................................................. 13. 15 
Pizzuto v . Idaho. --- U.S. ---. 128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008) ...................................................... 8 
Pizzuto v . State. 127 Idaho 469. 903 P.2d 58 (1995) ............................................ 11. 12. 15 
Pizzuto v . State. 134 Idaho 793. 10 P.3d 742 (2000) ........................................................ 15 
........................ Porter v . State. 136 Idaho 257. 32 P.3d 151 (2001) .............................. .... 15 
Porter v . State. 140 Idaho 780. 102 P.3d 1099 (2004) ................................................ 27 
Rhoades v . Idaho. --- U.S. ---. 128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008) ...................................................... 8 
Rhoades v . State. 135 Idaho 299. 17 P.3d 243 (2000) .................................................. 15 
Ring v . Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) ............................................................ 1. 7. 8. 10. 16 
Row v . State. 135 Idaho 573. 21 P.3d 895 (2001) .............................................. 15. 27. 28 
................................................................. Schriro v . Surnmerlin. 542 U.S. 348 (2004) 8 10 
th 
. ............................................................ Seymour v . Walker. 224 F.3d 542 (6 Cir 2000) 25 
.......................................................... Sivak v . State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000) 15 
.................................................. State v . Beam, 1 15 Idaho 208, 766 P.2d 678 (1 988) 13, 25 
...................................................... State v . Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981) 22 
................................................ Statev . Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991) 18, 26 
................................. State v . Charboneau, 1 16 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1 989) 16, 17, 18 
State v . Fetterly, 1 15 Idaho 23 1, 766 P.2d 701 (1 988) ............................................... 26, 27 
............................................... State v . Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 851 P.2d 934 (1993) 26 
..................................................... State v . Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003) 24 
..................................................... State v . O'Neill, 1 18 Idaho 244, 796 P.2d 12 1 (1 990) 24 
State v . Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991) ....................................... 12, 15, 25 
State v . Rhoades, 12 1 Idaho 63, 822 P.2d 960 (1 991) ............................................. 26 
...................................................... State v . Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1985) 1, 4 
..................... ................... State v . Townsend, 124 Idaho 881, 865 P.2d 972 (1993) . 18 
.................................................... State v . Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 852 P.2d 87 (1993) 7, 18 
State v . Whitman, 96 Idaho 489, 531 P.2d 579 (1975) .................  ............... 10, 18 
State v . Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ...................................................... 20 
Stuart v . State, 1 18 Idaho 865, 801 P.2d 12 16 (1 990) ...................................................... 5 
........................................................ Stuartv . State. 118 Idaho 932, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990) 5 
.......................................................... Stuart v . State, 127 Idaho 806, 907 P.2d 783 (1995) 6 
............ ............................. Stuart v . State, 128 Idaho 436, 914 P.2d 933 (1996) ........... 7, 18 
Stuart v . State, 136 Idaho 490, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001) .................................................... 6 
Teaeue v . Lane. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) ...........................  ........................................ 8. 10 
United States v . Ortiz. 136 F.3d 161 (D.C. Cir . 1998) ............................................. 25 
Walton v . Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) ............................................................................ 7 
Weaver v . Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1980) ........................................................................... 23 
Williams v . Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) ..................... . .......................................... 25 
STATUTES 
I.C. 5 19-2515 ........................................................................................................... 16, 17 
I.C. 5 19-2719 ......................................................................................................... passim 
I.C. 5 19-4202 .................................................................................................................. 27 
..................................................................................................................... I.C. 5 19-4908 5 
I.C. 5 73-101 .................................... ... .............................................................................. 19 
OTHER 
1984 Idaho Sess . Laws 389 ............................................................................................... 20 
1984 Idaho Sess . Laws 390 .............................................................................................. 20 
1995 Idaho Sess . Laws 594 .............................................................................................. 26 
CONSTITUTIONS 
Idaho Constitution. article I. 5 16 ................................................................................. 22 
United States Constitution, article I, 5 10 ......................................................................... 22 
RULES 
I.R.C.P. 60 .......................................................................................................................... 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Petitioner-Appellant Gene Francis Stuart appeals from the district court's 
Memorandum Opinion on Petition for Post Conviction Relief andor Writ of Habeas 
Corpus and Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, to Vacate Sentence of Death and for New 
Sentencing Trial ("Memorandum Order") and the Judgment Dismissing Case With 
Prejudice, denying relief from his successive post-conviction andor habeas petition and 
Rule 35 motion, all stemming from Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
The facts leading to Stuart's conviction for the first-degree torture murder of 
three-year-old Robert Miller are detailed in State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 165-66, 715 
Appellant and Kathy Miller, the mother of the deceased victim, 
Robert Miller, met in August, 1980, began dating, and subsequently 
moved in together on September 20, 1980. Robert Miller was at that time 
two years old, and he lived with appellant and his mother. Appellant then 
assumed control over Robert. At that time the child was not yet toilet 
trained, and much of the punishment imposed upon the child dealt with 
this problem. 
Appellant was a very dominant person and often critical of others 
in his presence. He was a strict disciplinarian who required almost adult 
behavior from Robert over the course of their relationship. Appellant and 
Kathy Miller often argued about his treatment of Robert, and Ms. Miller 
moved out of the premises several times after the child had been bruised 
and beaten by the defendant. 
In the spring and summer of 1981, appellant assumed primary 
control over Robert, feeding, clothing and caring for him. Robert often 
accompanied appellant to his place of business. 
In late summer and early fall of 1981, appellant and Ms. Miller 
began sharing the management duties at a small tavern near Orofino. 
Appellant and Ms. Miller would work separate shifts, with Miller working 
during the day and appellant working at night. Each would take care of 
Robert while the other was working. 
In October of 1980, there suddenly appeared bruises and blisters 
on Robert's backside. In November of 1980, Robert had bruises across his 
forehead and a black eye. Later in November, Robert sustained a tom and 
cut ear. Various explanations were given by appellant for these injuries, 
including a spanking with a stick for the backside bruises, and a tricycle 
collision for the black eye. After the tom ear appeared, Ms. Miller moved 
out because of the injuries to her son. Appellant later apologized and 
convinced Miller to move back in. Ms. Miller apparently moved in and 
out several times, at least some of which moves resulted from the force 
used in Robert's discipline. 
In March Robert's bottom, up the middle of his back, was covered 
with bruises, which the defendant claimed resulted from a fall in the 
shower. In April, Robert had bruises on his chin. Robert had little round 
bruises on his chest in November of 1980 and September of 1981. These 
bruises appeared because of appellant's habit of jabbing him in the chest 
with a finger while scolding him. 
Appellant had other unique requirements. He attempted to teach 
Robert, a two year old, table manners, requiring that Roberi learn to 
properly use his fork (pick it up with the left hand, transfer it to the right 
hand, etc.) and use his napkin to wipe his mouth after every bite. If Robert 
failed to perform correctly, he was often made to stand in a comer. Other 
requirements of Robert were that he look only at his plate, and replace his 
fork on the table after every bite. Appellant demanded these movements 
of Robert while failing to follow them himself. At one time appellant hit 
Robert on the hand with his fork when he picked up the fork with the 
wrong hand. 
There were two behaviors exhibited by Robert that appellant 
punished in particular. One was "boobing", roughly translated as pouting 
or sulking. The other was wetting his pants. After Robert would wet his 
pants or exhibit any other unacceptable behavior, he would be given a cold 
shower from which he would emerge shaking with cold and blue lips. 
In May of 1981, Robert's penis was darkly bruised on the top and 
bottom. There was no explanation for this injury. Also in May Robert's 
bottom and head were bruised and scratched. Appellant explained that 
Robert fell because the toilet seat broke when he sat on it. Also in May, a 
silver dollar sized patch of hair was discovered as missing from Robert's 
head. In early spring, Robert complained of a hurt left arm, although no 
visible marks were seen. 
On September 19, 1981, Ms. Miller was working the day shift at 
the tavern with appellant caring for Robert. Appellant gave his version of 
the events of that day at trial -- the only version available, since appellant 
and Robert where alone during the day. Robert spent two hours at a 
friend's house, where appellant picked him up and took him home. He 
attempted to feed him lunch, but Robert refused to eat. According to 
appellant, he then began poking Robert in the chest as punishment. He 
then struck him in the chest with his fist, swatted him and directed him to 
eat. Robert then proceeded to eat with no complaints. After Robert 
finished eating, he was put down for a nap. According to appellant he 
later went to check on him and found that Robert had vomited on the bed. 
Appellant then bathed Robert and put him back down. However, he then 
noticed that Robert's breathing was unusual. Appellant testified that at 
this point Robert was still alive. He attempted mouth-to-mouth 
resuscitation, and Robert again vomited. Appellant then purportedly 
rushed Robert to the hospital. Robert was dead on arrival. Emergency 
room personnel noted that Robert's body was cold, indicating the 
possibility that he had been dead for longer than appellant's testimony 
would indicate. 
An autopsy was conducted upon Robert, which disclosed the cause 
of death as internal hemorrhaging caused by the rupture of the liver. The 
pathologist felt that this rupture was caused by more than one blow; 
however, he admitted that a well placed single blow could have caused the 
rupture. The pathologist also testified that death would have occurred 
between one and one and a half hours after such injury, contradicting 
appellant's testimony concerning the time frame of events of the 
afternoon. A number of bruises were found on the victim's body, both 
internal and external. These bruises were of differing ages. In addition, 
Robert had suffered a subdural hematoma in the head region, which the 
pathologist testified would have been caused only by a fair amount of 
blunt trauma to the head. Also, X-rays taken of Robert indicated that he 
had suffered a broken left arm several months before the date of death. 
An Amended Information was filed charging Stuart with first-degree murder by 
torture and a habitual offender sentencing enhancement. (#14865, R., pp.14-16.)' Upon 
completion of his trial, a jury found Stuart guilty as charged (#14866, R., p.70) and he 
pled guilty to the sentencing enhancement (#14865, p.81). The state filed a Notice of 
' Because there are several records and transcripts involved in this appeal from several 
different cases in w, the state will refer to the records and transcripts by their 
respective supreme court numbers. 
Intent to Request Death Penalty. (#14865, R., pp.83-84.) After a sentencing hearing, the 
district court found the state had proven two statutory aggravating factors: (1) the murder 
was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel and (2) the defendant by prior conduct or 
conduct in the commission of the murder at hand has exhibited a propensity to commit 
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society. (#14865, R., 
pp.214-15.) After concluding, "it could find nothing in mitigation which would outweigh 
the aggravated circumstances of this crime and this defendant," the court sentenced Stuart 
to death. (#14865, R., pp.216,227-28.) 
Among the issues on appeal, Stuart contended, "participation of the jury in the 
sentencing process should have been required." Stuart I, 110 Idaho at 174. The Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected Stuart's argument, "We have also considered the argument that 
the jury should participate in sentencing and have not found it to be constitutionally 
required. [Citations omitted]. We see nothing presented by the facts of this case which 
would otherwise require jury participation." Id. at 175. On May 3, 1985, Stuart's 
conviction and death sentence were affirmed on appeal. See StuartI. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's First Post-Conviction Case 
Stuart filed his first post-conviction petition on June 3, 1986 (#17014, R., pp.163- 
77), which included a claim that juries are constitutionally required to find statutory 
aggravating factors before the death penalty can be imposed (#17014, R., p.164).2 The 
district court gave notice of its intent to summarily dismiss Stuart's petition. (#17014, R., 
pp. 189-95.) Expressly addressing Stuart's claim regarding jury participation in a capital 
Stuart's first post-conviction case was filed under the same district court case number as 
his underlying conviction and death sentence, #8495. 
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sentencing, the court recognized it should be dismissed because the issue was addressed 
on direct appeal. (#17014, R., p.190.) The district court denied post-conviction relief. 
(#17014, R., pp.234-41.) On October 16, 1990, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 867, 801 P.2d 1216 (1990) (Stuart 11). 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's Second Post-Conviction Case 
Stuart's second post-conviction petition was filed September 12, 1988, which 
contended government officials had recorded attorney-client communications while he 
was in the Cleanvater County Jail. (#18653, R., pp.24-45.) Relying upon the Uniform 
Post-Conviction Procedures Act ("UPCPA"), the state filed a memorandum asserting the 
petition was an improper second petition. (#18653, R., pp.85-93.) The district court 
entered an order indicating its intent to dismiss, concluding the "newly discovered 
evidence" of alleged monitoring "fail[ed] to raise a substantial question of fact which 
would change the conviction or sentencing" and, based upon I.C. $ 19-4908, that the 
petition was an improper second petition because Stuart failed to establish the claims 
"were not available or known to the Petitioner at the time the original petition was filed." 
(#18653, R., pp.94-103.) After Stuart responded, the district court entered its final order 
dismissing post-conviction relief. (#18653, R., pp.176-78.) 
Relying upon I.C. 5 19-4908, on appeal, the supreme court determined Stuart's 
successive petition was timely because "the facts surrounding the second petition were 
not known to the appellant until the summer of 1988." Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 
934, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990) (Stuart 111). Concluding there were material issues of fact 
concerning the monitoring and recording of attorney-client conversations, the supreme 
court also remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 934. 
On remand, the district court bifurcated the evidentiary hearing, concluding it 
would first determine whether attorney-client conversations were actually monitored or 
recorded. (#20060, Tr., pp.166-67.) After the evidentiary hearing, the district court 
determined Stuart failed to meet his burden of establishing any attorney-client 
conversations were monitored or recorded. (#20060, R., pp.537-70.) 
On appeal, the supreme court concluded the district court erred when it found the 
destruction of some phone logs was not attributable to the state and, because the state 
allegedly concealed the existence of a taped conversation between Stuart and his sister 
which allegedly would have led to the discovery of "surreptitious tape recording 
sufficient to preserve the phone logs," the supreme court remanded the case with 
instructions to give Stuart "the benefit of a favorable inference concerning the destroyed 
evidence." Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 814-17,907 P.2d 783 (1995) (Stuart IV). 
On remand, the district court concluded the "favorable inference concerning the 
destroyed evidence" supported Stuart's contention that attorney-client conversations were 
monitored andor recorded, and held another evidentiary hearing to determine whether 
the evidence at trial "had an origin independent of the eavesdropping." (#26661, R., 
pp.75-84.) After the hearing, the district court found the state had proven three 
exceptions to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, including: (1) the independent 
source exception; (2) the inevitable discovery exception; and (3) the attenuated basis 
exception. (#26661, R., pp.367-95.) Therefore, the court entered judgment denying post- 
conviction relief. (#26661, R., pp.396-97.) On December 4, 2001, the Idaho Supreme 
Court affirmed. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001) (Stuart VI). 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's Rule 60(b) Motion 
While litigating his second post-conviction petition, Stuart filed a Motion for 
Relief from Judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b) in his first post-conviction case, contending 
State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 852 P.2d 87 (1993) -- in which the Idaho Supreme Court 
reversed a murder case because the jury was not instructed on second degree murder by 
torture -- should be applied retroactively to his case. (#21654, R., pp.1-11.) Concluding 
that "authority in this and other jurisdictions, as well as the law of this case, Tribe should 
not be applied retroactively to Stuart," the district court denied Stuart's motion. (#21654, 
R., pp.17-19.) On February 15, 1996, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court, concluding, "Even if Tribe had overruled Stuart I, the fact that Stuart I was final 
when Tribe was issued would preclude retroactive application." Stuart v. State, 128 
Idaho 436,438,914 P.2d 933 (1996) (citing Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,418-19, 825 
P.2d 1073 (1991) (Stuart V) ("holding new decision on death penalty sentencing did not 
apply retroactively to already final case")). 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's Third Post-Conviction case3 
On June 24, 2002, the Supreme Court issued &, expressly overruling, in part, 
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), which had held a judge, sitting without a jury, 
was permitted to find statutory aggravating factors even if necessary for imposition of the 
death penalty, and found that a jury must now find the statutory aggravating 
circumstances before a death sentence can be imposed. 
Stuart also filed a fourth post-conviction petition which is the subject of a separate 
appeal pending before this Court. (#34200, R., pp. 1-44,) 
7 
On August 2, 2002, relying exclusively upon m, Stuart filed his instant Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Correct Illegal 
Sentence, to Vacate Sentence of Death and for New Sentencing Trial, containing ten 
separate claims. (#34198, R., pp.5-16.) The state filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal 
(#34198, R., pp.50-51), which the district court granted, concluding, pursuant to 
v. Surnmerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), and Hoffman v. State, 142 Idaho 27, 121 P.3d 958 
(2005), that Ring is not retroactive in cases on collateral review. (#34198, R., pp.319- 
22.) Judgment was filed April 18, 2007. (#34198, R., pp.344-46.) Stuart filed timely 
notices of appeal on April 23,2007. (#34198, R., pp.350-59.) 
While Stuart's instant appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued Danforth v. 
Minnesota, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Q. 1029, 1035 (2008), holding that the federal rule of 
retroactivity articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), does not limit state 
courts from applying a broader rule of retroactivity even if the new rule of law is based 
upon the federal Constitution. Five Idaho death-sentenced inmates had petitions for 
certiorari pending at that time raising similar arguments, which were granted with an 
order remanding to the Idaho Supreme Court "for further consideration in light of 
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. --- (2008)." Rhoades v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 
1441 (2008); McKinney v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008); Pizzuto v. Idaho, --- 
U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008); Card V. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Q. 1442 (2008); 
Hairston v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008).~ 
The appeals on remand are pending before the Idaho Supreme Court, which has 
consolidated the cases for purposes of briefing and oral argument. 
Stuart has stated the issue on appeal as follows: 
Whether, under the settled Idaho three-part test for determining the 
extent to which a new court decision retroactively applies, Ring must be 
applied in Petitioner's case. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 1 .) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as follows: 
Because his successive post-conviction petition is governed by I.C. 4 19-2719, 
which does not contain a provision for the retroactive application of new rules of law, has 
Stuart failed to establish the district court had jurisdiction to grant him post-conviction 
relief based upon the dictates of Ring v. Arizona, and because Stuart has failed to meet 
the dictates of LC. 4 19-2719, must his appeal be dismissed? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Grant Stuart Post-Conviction Relief 
Because I.C. 6 19-2719 Does Not Grant The Courts Jurisdiction To Retroactively Apvly 
New Rules Of Law In Cases On Collateral Review 
A. Introduction 
~ l t h o u ~ h  Stuart's successive petition raises ten different claims, each is based 
upon Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The district court dismissed Stuart's petition 
based upon Schriro v. Sunmerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), which held that Ring is not 
retroactive under Teanue v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which is the federal retroactivity 
law that generally prohibits the retroactive application of new rules of law to cases on 
collateral review. The court also relied upon Hoffman v. State, 142 Idaho 27, 121 P.3d 
958 (2005), concluding the Idaho Supreme Court had applied in determining 
Ring has no retroactive application in Idaho. 
Based upon Danforth v. Minnesota, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1029 (2008), Stuart 
contends the district court erred because it did not apply the three-part test articulated in 
State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489,491,531 P.2d 579 (1975), for the retroactive application 
of new rules of law, which follows the three-part test adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), that was abandoned by the Court in Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) and m. 
Idaho Code Cj 19-2719 imposes a jurisdictional bar which prohibits the courts 
from granting relief stemming from capital successive post-conviction claims unless the 
claim fits the narrow exception of I.C. Cj 19-2719(5). Because I.C. Cj 19-2719 does not 
provide an exception for the retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law, the 
district court was without jurisdiction to grant post-conviction relief and this Court is 
without jurisdiction to reverse the district court. Therefore, the state expressly moves this 
Court to dismiss Stuart's appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently articulated the standard of review in appeals 
stemming from the denial of post-conviction relief in capital successive petitions. "When 
this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of 
Idaho Code 3 19-2719, the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to 
directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of section 19- 
2719 have beenmet, and rule accordingly." Hairstonv. State, 144 Idaho 51,55, 156 P.3d 
552 (2007) (quoting Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 575, 51 P.3d 387 (2002)), remanded 
on other grounds Hairston v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008). 
C. Stuart's Successive Post-Conviction Petition Is Governed By I.C. 6 19-2719 
Idaho Code 5 19-2719 sets forth special appellate and post-conviction procedures 
in all capital cases. Capital post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post-conviction 
proceedings which are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
(UPCPA), are civil in nature and governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470, 903 P.2d 58 (1995). Idaho Code 5 19-2719 does 
not eliminate the applicability of the UPCPA in capital cases, but acts as a modifier and 
"supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions conflict." McKinne~ v. State, 
133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144 (1999); m, 127 Idaho at 470. 
Specifically, I.C. $ 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity to raise 
all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction relief petition which 
must be filed within forty-two days after entry of judgment. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). The only exception is provided in I.C. 5 19-2719(5), 
which permits a successive petition "in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated 
that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within 
the time frame allowed by the statute." Id. 120 Idaho at 807. If a capital defendant fails 
to comply with the specific requirements of I.C. 5 19-2719, including the specified time 
limits, the issues are "deemed to have [been] waived" and "[tlhe courts of Idaho shall 
have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any 
such relief." LC. $ 19-2719(5); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700. 
A capital defendant who brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has 
a "heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that 
petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute." Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 
471. Even if the petitioner can demonstrate the claims were not known or could not 
reasonably have been known, I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(a) details the additional requirements that 
must be met before the successive petition may be heard: 
An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be 
heard because of the applicability of the exception herein for issues that 
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not be 
considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a 
precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) material 
facts stated under oath or affirmation by credible persons with first hand 
knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that 
fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or 
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed. 
I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(a). Failure to meet the requirements of I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(a) mandates 
dismissal of the successive post-conviction petition. Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289- 
Additionally, claims which were not known or which could not have reasonably 
been known within forty-two days of judgment "must be asserted within a reasonable 
time after they are known or reasonably could have been known." Paz v. State, 123 
Idaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701. If the petitioner 
fails to comply with each of the requirements detailed in I.C. 5 19-2719(5), the petition 
must be summarily dismissed. I.C. 5 19-2719(5) specifically provides: 
If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section 
and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived 
such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been 
known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such 
claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the Idaho Supreme 
Court discussed the purpose and policy behind the passage of I.C. 5 19-2719: 
The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to 
expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of 
dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to "thwart their sentences." 
The statute's purpose is to "avoid such abuses of legal process by 
requiring that a11 collateral claims for relief . . . be consolidated in one 
proceeding. . . ." We hold that the legislature's determination that it was 
necessary to reduce the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational 
basis for the imposition of the 42-day time limit set for I.C. 5 19-2719. 
The legislature has identified the problem and attempted to remedy it with 
a statutory scheme that is rationally related to the legitimate legislative 
purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed sentences. 
The United States Supreme Court has specifically approved requiring a criminal 
defendant to present all of his collateral claims in a single post-conviction proceeding. In 
Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), the Court, discussing federal habeas corpus 
proceedings which prohibit piecemeal litigation by requiring that all claims be brought in 
a single petition for a writ of habeas corpus, explained the respective states can employ a 
similar procedure for post-conviction relief procedures. The Court concluded: 
There can be no doubt that States may likewise provide, as Maine 
has done, that a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must assert all 
known constitutional claims in a single proceeding. Indeed, the Court of 
Appeals agreed that the Maine statutory scheme was an "orderly 
procedure of the state courts," as that term is used in Fay v. Noia, 1372 
U.S. 391, 438, 83 S. Ct. 822, 849, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963)l. No prisoner 
has a right either under the Federal Constitution or under 28 U.S.C. S: 2241 
to insist upon piecemeal collateral attack on a presumptively valid 
criminal conviction in the face of such a statutory provision. 
Id. at 45-46. 
-
Idaho Code § 19-2719 also has a great deal of interplay with federal habeas law. 
The ability of a state to ensure that its judgments carry a measure of finality rather than 
being subject to repetitive federal attack, depends in substantial measure on the regular 
and consistent enforcement of state procedural rules and bars. Addressing the interplay 
between state procedural bars and federal review, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. 
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988), refused to honor a state procedural bar. The Court 
i 
explained: 
[W]e consider whether that bar provides an adequate and independent 
state ground for the refusal to vacate petitioner's sentence. "[W]e have 
consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in 
compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a 
federal question is itself a federal question." Henry v. Mississippi, 379 
U.S. 443, 447, [85 S. Ct. 564, 567, 13 L. Ed. 2d 4081 (1965). "[A] state 
procedural ground is not 'adequate' unless the procedural rule is 'strictly 
or regularly followed.' Burr v. City o f  Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, [84 
S. Ct. 1734, 1736, 12 L. Ed. 2d 7661 (1964)." Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 
U.S. 255,262-263, 102 S. Ct. 2421, 2426-2427, 72 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1982); 
see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. at 447-448, 85 S. Ct. at 567-568. We 
find no evidence that the procedural bar relied on by the Mississippi 
Supreme Court here has been consistently or regularly applied. Rather, 
the weight of Mississippi law is to the contrary. 
Id. at 587. 
-
The Idaho Supreme Court has historically followed the requirements of I.C. 5 19- 
2719, strictly and regularly dismissing successive capital post-conviction relief claims 
because of petitioners' failure to meet the narrow exception of I.C. § 19-2719(5). See 
Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 51 P.3d 387 (2002); Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257, 32 
P.3d 151 (2001); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573,21 P.3d 895 (2001); Rhoades v. State, 135 
Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243 (2000); Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (1996); 
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995); Lankford v. State, 127 Idaho 100, 
897 P.2d 991 (1995); Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); Fetterly v. 
w, 121 Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991). The Court has also historically followed the 
requirements of I.C. 5 19-2719, strictly and regularly affirming the district courts' 
dismissal of successive capital post-conviction claims because of petitioners' failure to 
meet the narrow exceptions of I.C. 5 19-2719(5), including the pleading requirements of 
I.C. $5 19-2719(5)(a) and (b). See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000); 
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 
P.3d 636 (2000); McKinnev v. State, 133 Idaho 695,992 P.2d 144 (1999). 
D. Because The Claims In His Successive Petition Do Not Fall Within The 
Exception Contained In I.C. 6 19-2719(5), Stuart's Appeal Must Be Dismissed 
As detailed above, capital defendants are provided only one opportunity to raise 
all factual and legal challenges to the conviction and sentence, which must be filed within 
forty-two days after entry of judgment. Rhoades, 120 Idaho at 806. The only exception 
is for those claims which were not known and reasonably could not have been known 
within the time frame allowed by the statute. Id. As in Hoffman, 142 Idaho at 30, 
because Stuart previously raised the claim of jury participation in a capital sentencing, the 
claims in his successive petition "were clearly known and asserted in prior proceedings." 
Therefore, on the basis of I.C. 19-2719(5), Stuart has failed to meet the only exception 
permitting the filing of claims in a successive petition and, on this basis alone, his appeal 
must be dismissed. 
However, Stuart contends this Court should apply the three-prong Linkletter test 
for determining whether Ring is retroactive in cases on collateral review in Idaho. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.2-12.) Contrary to Stuart's contention "that this Court has never 
wavered in its adherence to its three-pronged test for determining the retroactive effect of 
new rules of law" (Appellant's brief, p.2.), this Court has never applied the three- 
pronged Linkletter test in capital cases. Rather, this Court has implicitly applied I.C. § 
19-271 9 to address whether Idaho law permits the retroactive application of new rules of 
law raised in successive post-conviction petitions. 
In Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991), the petitioner 
contended, "the Charboneau interpretation of LC. 8 19-2515 was not a claim that was 
known or should have been known" when he filed his initial post-conviction petition.5 
Because Charboneau had not been issued prior to the filing of his initial post-conviction 
petition, Fetterly contended the claim was not known and reasonably could not have been 
known when he filed his initial petition, and that it should be given retroactive 
application. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized Charboneau was issued after the 
petitioner filed his first post-conviction petition, but expressly reframed the issue, stating, 
"the claim that the Charboneau interpretation of I.C. 5 19-2515 was not known or should 
In State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989), the supreme court 
concluded, "the trial court may sentence the defendant to death, only if the trial court 
finds that all the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the 
aggravating circumstances found and made imposition of death unjust." 
not have been known misses the real issue. The real issue is whether Charboneau applies 
retroactively to cases that were final at the time of its issuance." Fetterly, 121 Idaho at 
418. Relying upon Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 3 14 (1987), the court recognized, "the 
distinction between defendants whose cases were final before the issuance of 
Ckarboneau and those whose cases were not is a valid distinction." Id. at 418-19. Based 
upon that distinction, the court refused to retroactively apply Charboneau, concluding, 
"the Charboneau interpretation of I.C. 3 19-2515 does not apply to the present case 
because the present case was final prior to the issuance of Ckarboneau." Id. 
In dissent, Justice Bistline addressed the three-pronged Linkletter test and noted 
Idaho had used the test "in both direct appeals and collateral attacks to determine the 
retroactive effect of cases." Fetterlv, 121 Idaho at 420 (Bistline, J., dissenting). Justice 
Bistline explained the Griffith test requires new constitutional rules to be applied 
retroactively in criminal cases "to all cases pending on direct review or which are not yet 
final" and did not apply to cases on collateral review. Id. Because Griffith addressed 
only retroactivity in direct review cases involving new constitutional rules, Justice 
Bistline advocated for a continuation of the Linkletter three-part test for new rules of law 
in cases on collateral review. Id. at 420-21. However, the majority rejected Justice 
Bistline's position when it relied upon Griffith, and concluded, "the Charboneau 
interpretation of I.C. 3 19-2515 does not apply to the present case because the present 
case was final prior to the issuance of Ckarboneau." Id. at 419. 
Stuart apparently contends the Court's discussion of Griffith was mere dicta and 
should not be followed. (Appellant's brief, p.31.) This contention is simply incorrect. 
As expressly stated by the court, the issue was not whether the Charboneau claim was 
known or could have been known, "[tjhe real issue is whether Charboneau applies 
retroactively to cases that were final at the time of its issuance." Fetterly, 121 Idaho at 
418. Tliis language clearly establishes the Court's holding -- that Charboneau did not 
apply retroactively -- was based upon Griffith, and implied that I.C. § 19-2719 does not 
contain a retroactivity exception for new claims in successive petitions. 
However, even if dicta, it has been cited as the holding in subsequent cases. For 
example, this basic principle of law was applied in Stuart V, in which the petitioner 
sought retroactive application of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in State v. Tribe, 
123 Idaho 721, 852 P.2d 87 (1993), which reversed a murder conviction because the jury 
was not instructed on second-degree murder by torture. Relying upon Fetterl~, the 
supreme court concluded, because Stuart's case was final when was issued, the 
court was precluded from applying retroactively. Stuart V, 128 Idaho at 438. 
The three-part Linkletter test was also implicitly rejected in State v. Card, 121 
Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991), in which this Court applied Pavne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808 (1991), which overruled in part, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
Justice Bistline, again in dissent, contended that under Whitman, should not be 
applied retroactively, m, 121 Idaho at 461-63 (Bistline, J., dissenting), which this 
Court implicitly rejected when it applied Payne without any reference to the three-part 
Linkletter test from Whitman. 
Likewise, in Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899, 901, 935 P.2d 162 (1997), the 
petitioner sought the retroactive application of State v. Townsend, 124 Idaho 881, 865 
P.2d 972 (1993), which held that hands, other body parts, or appendages may not by 
themselves constitute deadly weapons under the aggravated assault and aggravated 
battery statutes. Again, relying upon w, the court concluded Townsend would not 
be retroactively applied because the petitioner's direct appeal was final. w, 129 
Idaho at 165-65. 
Since Griffith, this Court has declined to retroactively apply new rules of law to 
cases on collateral review in criminal cases. More importantly, there simply is not an 
exception under I.C. 5 19-2719 providing for the retroactive application of either new 
state or federal rules of law. Because there is no exception for the retroactive application 
of new rules of law, Stuart's claims fail and were properly dismissed by the district court 
requiring dismissal of his appeal by this Court. 
E. The Legislature Has Stated Its Clear Intent That I.C. 6 19-2719(5) Be Av~lied 
Retroactively In Capital Cases 
Stuart contends the "anti-retroactivity provision" of I.C. 5 19-2719 "cannot be 
applied retroactively" because it "contains no express legislative statement that it should 
itself be retroactively applied." (Appellant's brief, p.33.) Because Stuart's argument is 
incorrect, it is without merit. 
Idaho law "prohibits the retroactive application of newly passed legislation." 
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 804, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992) (citing I.C. 5 73-101). 
However, I.C. 73-101 provides an exception when the legislature declares its intent to 
make a new rule of law retroactive. Id. When the legislature enacted I.C. 5 19-2719 in 
1984, it included the relevant portion of section (S), which reads as follows, "If the 
defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits 
specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or 
reasonably should have been known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to 
consider any such claim for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief." 1984 
Idaho Sess. Laws 389. This portion of the statute is the same even today. At the time 
1.C. § 19-2719 was passed, the legislature also expressly stated: 
This act shall apply to all cases in which capital sentences were 
imposed on or prior to the effective date of this act but which have not 
been carried out, and to all capital cases arising after the effective date of 
this act. 
1984 Idaho Sess. Laws 390. 
This language clearly states the legislature's intent to make I.C. 9 19-2719(5) 
retroactive to all capital cases. Because of this language, Stuart's argument regarding the 
retroactivity of I.C. 9 19-2719(5) fails. 
F. Stuart Has Failed To Establish LC. 6 19-2719 Violates Either The State Or 
Federal Constitutions 
Stuart raises several constitutional challenges to I.C. § 19-2719, including: (1) 
Idaho's separation of powers doctrine; (2) the ex post facto doctrine; and (3) due process 
andequal protection. (Appellant's brief, pp.34-35.) Because Stuart has failed to support 
his contentions with authority and argument, they are waived. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966 (1996). However, even if they are not waived, Stuart's 
contentions fail. 
1. LC. 6 19-2719 Does Not Violate The Idaho Constitution's Separation Of 
Powers Doctrine 
Stuart contends I.C. § 19-2719 violates Idaho's constitutional separation of 
powers doctrine. (Appellant's brief, p.34.) While Idaho's appellate courts have not 
directly addressed this issue, it has been addressed in the context of habeas corpus. 
In Mahaffev v. State, 87 Idaho 228,280, 392 P.2d 279 (1964), the Idaho Supreme 
Court explained that because the writ of habeas corpus is expressly recognized in Idaho's 
constitution, "the writ is not a statutory remedy." The court concluded, "While the 
legislature (absent certain contingencies) is without power to abridge this remedy secured 
by the Constitution, it may add to the efficacy of the writ. Statutes are usually enacted 
for this purpose and should be construed so as to promote the effectiveness of the 
proceeding." Id. Addressing the enactment of the UPCPA, the supreme court concluded 
the UPCPA is "an expansion of the Writ of Habeas Corpus." Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 
235,237,459 P.2d 1017 (1969). 
Because the UPCPA is an expansion of the writ of habeas corpus and the 
legislature is not barred from adding to the efficacy of the writ, it naturally follows that 
I.C. § 19-2719 does not unduly restrict the district court's jurisdiction in violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine. Rather, I.C. § 19-2719 merely establishes the parameters 
in which relief may be granted when a successive post-conviction petition has been filed. 
As explained in Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Ctr., 134 Idaho 464, 471, 4 P.3d 
1 1 15 (2000): 
Because it is properly within the power of the legislature to establish 
statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, create new causes of action, and 
otherwise modify the common law without violating separation of powers 
principles, it necessarily follows that the legislature also has the power to 
limit remedies available to plaintiffs without violating the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
Because the legislature has the power to limit the remedies available to plaintiffs, 
it necessarily has the power to limit the remedies of capital petitioners in seeking post- 
conviction relief. Stuart has failed to establish I.C. § 19-2719 results in a constitutional 
violation under the separation of powers doctrine. 
2. Idaho Code 6 19-271 9(5) Does Not Violate Ex Post Facto Laws 
The United States Constitution, article I, § 10, and the Idaho Constitution, article 
I, 5 16, prohibit the enactment of ex post facto laws. As explained in State v. Byers, the 
United States Supreme Court has defined what constitutes an ex post facto law: 
lst, every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and 
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. 
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when 
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a 
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of 
the offense, in order to convict the offender. 
102 Idaho 159, 166, 627 P.2d 788 (1981) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 
The Supreme Court's ex post facto jurisprudence has focused upon the third 
category because such laws "implicate the central concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause: 
lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases 
punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated." Lvnce v. 
m, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
As explained in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977), the Ex Post Facto 
Clause generally does not apply to procedural matters: 
It is equally well settled, however, that the inhibition upon the 
passage of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in 
all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was committed. 
The constitutional provision was intended to secure substantial personal 
rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, and not to limit the 
legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not 
affect matters of substance. 
Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a 
procedural change is not ex post facto. 
(Internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court has identified "two critical elements [that] must be present for 
a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: It must be retrospective, that is, it must apply 
to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected 
by it." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1980)(footnote omitted). However, "no ex 
post facto violation occurs if the change effected is merely procedural, and does not 
increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts 
necessary to establish guilt." Id. at 29 11.12. "Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and 
governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was 
prescribed when the crime was consummated." Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court, in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), narrowed 
what constitutes an ex post facto violation by overruling several prior cases. After the 
defendant was sentenced, the Texas legislature amended the remedy that was available 
when an unauthorized fine was imposed at sentencing. Under the law at the time the 
defendant was sentenced, if the law did not authorize the fine, the judgment and sentence 
were void and the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Id. 497 U.S. at 39. After 
Youngblood was sentenced, new legislation was enacted permitting the appellate court to 
merely reform an improper verdict, thereby eliminating the new trial remedy. Id. at 40. 
The Supreme Court reiterated that procedural changes do not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. Id. at 45. The Court reasoned, "While these cases do not explicitly define what 
they mean by the word 'procedural,' it is logical to think that the term refers to changes in 
the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed to changes in the 
substantive law of crimes." Id. at 45. The Court concluded the new statute "is a 
procedural change that allows reformation of improper verdicts. It does not alter the 
definition of the crime of aggravated sexual abuse, . . . nor does it increase the 
punishment for which he is eligible." Id. at 44 (emphasis added). The Court explained 
that language from other cases discussing whether a procedural change may violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause if it deprived a defendant of "substantial protections" or infringed 
upon "substantial personal rights" had "imported confusion into the interpretation of the 
Ex Post Facto Clause." Id. at 45. 
Idaho's appellate courts have followed the Supreme Court cases detailed above. 
See State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 69-70, 90 P.3d 278 (2003). In Mellinger v. State, 
113 Idaho 31, 34, 740 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1987), the Idaho Court of Appeals quoted 
Dobbert, in concluding that a change in the statute of limitations in Idaho's Uniform 
Post-Conviction Procedures Act ("UPCPA") was procedural in nature and did not 
materially affect the petitioner's substantial rights. See also LaFon v. State, 119 Idaho 
387, 389-90, 807 P.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1991); Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 913 P.2d 
1160 (Ct. App. 1996). The Idaho Supreme Court expressly adopted Mellin~er in State v. 
O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 247, 796 P.2d 121 (1990). In Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 
-. 
227,912 P.2d 110 (1996), the Idaho Supreme Court applied the rationale of O'Neill in a 
capital case. 
This same analysis has also been applied to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which was enacted by Congress in 1996 and significantly 
changed the manner in which federal habeas cases are litigated and limited the cases in 
which the federal courts can grant habeas relief. The federal courts have uniformly held 
that, because the changes made by the AEDPA are procedural in nature, they do not 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Libby v. Mamusson, 177 F.3d 43, 46-47 (lSt Cir. 
1999); Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 560 (6" Cir. 2000); Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 
917, 921 (11" Cir. 1998) (overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362 (2000)); United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161, 168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
Similar analysis was used in Mitchell v. State, 934 P.2d 346, 349 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1997), when the petitioner challenged amendments to Oklahoma's capital post- 
conviction statutes. The court explained that, because such changes were "procedural in 
nature," they did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. 
Likewise, the enactment of I.C. 5 19-2719(5) was procedural in nature. The 
statute "neither made criminal a theretofore innocent act, nor aggravated a crime 
previously committed, nor provided a greater punishment, nor changed the proof 
necessary to convict." Seymour, 224 F.3d at 560 (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293). 
Rather, "these provisions simply limit the circumstances under which [Stuart] may 
collaterally attack his conviction." u, 177 F.3d at 46. Stuart has, therefore, failed to 
establish an ex post facto violation. 
3. Idaho Code 4 19-2719(5) Does Not Violate Stuart's Due Process Or Eaual 
Protection Rights 
Stuart contends I.C. 5 19-2719(5) violates his equal protection and due process 
rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.34-35.) In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 21 1-13, 766 P.2d 
678 (1 988), the court expressly held I.C. 19-271 9 does not violate equal protection. In 
State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991j, the court expressly 
concluded I.C. § 19-2719 does not violate due process. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
repeatedly affirmed both of these cases. See Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51, 55, 156 
P.3d 552 (2007), remanded on other grounds Hairston v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 
1442 (2008); Lankford v. State, 127 Idaho 100, 102, 897 P.2d 991 (1995); State v. 
Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 647, 851 P.2d 934 (1993); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 430- 
3 1, 825 P.2d 108 1 (1 991); State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 72, 822 P.2d 960 (1 991); & 
v. State, 118 Idaho 542, 559, 798 P.2d 1 (1990); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 235-36, 
766 P.2d 701 (1988). Because Stuart has failed to even cite these cases, he obviously has 
failed to provide any argument as to why they are not controlling or should be 
reconsidered. 
G. Because The Claims In His Successive Petition Seek The Retroactive Application 
Of A New Rule Of Law In Violation Of I.C. 6 19-2719(5)(c), Stuart's Appeal 
Must Be Dismissed 
In 1995, the Idaho Legislature enacted I.C. § 19-2719(5)(c), which expressly 
states, "A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall be deemed 
facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of law." 
1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 594. Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)(c) is based upon the Court's 
decision in Fetterly, which discussed the question of retroactivity. While Fetterly did not 
expressly cite I.C. 19-2719(5), the legislature obviously wanted to ensure Justice 
Bistline's dissent did not result in a judicially created exception permitting the retroactive 
application of new rules of law in violation of the legislature's clear intent to limit claims 
in successive petitions to those which were not known and could not reasonably have 
been known when a capital petitioner's first petition was filed. 
Stuart does not dispute that the claims in his successive petition are based upon 
the retroactive application of a new rule of law, but challenges the statute, contending it 
violates the following: (1) Idaho's separation of powers doctrine; (2) Idaho's law 
regarding the retroactive application of new statutes; (3) due process and equal 
protection; and (4) the ex post facto doctrine. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-29.) However, 
Stuart has failed to explain how the analysis regarding his challenges is significantly 
different from the challenges he makes regarding I.C. 5 19-2719(5). Because I.C. 9 19- 
2719(5)(c) is nothing more than a reaffirmation and codification of Fetterly, there is no 
significant difference in the analysis associated with I.C. 9 19-2719(5). Therefore, the 
state relies upon its discussion above as it relates to I.C. 5 19-2719(5). 
H. Stuart Is Precluded From Challenging The Validity Of His Conviction Or 
Sentence Via A Writ Of Habeas Corpus 
Stuart attempts to salvage the claims in his successive post-conviction petition by 
alternatively characterizing it as a "Writ of Habeas Corpus." (Appellant's brief, pp.35- 
37.) An identical argument was expressly rejected by this Court in Porter v. State, 140 
Idaho 780,783, 102 P.3d 1099 (2004). 
However, even if Stuart's claims in his successive petition could be raised in a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, the district court was without jurisdiction to hear his 
claims. Idaho Code 8 19-4202 expressly grants original jurisdiction to consider a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus to the Idaho Supreme Court or "[tlhe district court of the county 
in which the person is detained." In Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895 (2001), 
the district court dismissed a habeas claim based upon the length and conditions of the 
petitioner's confinement. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed Row's claim 
because she filed the petition in Ada County, but was being detained at the Pocatello 
Women's Correctional Center. id. 135 Idaho at 580. 
As detailed in Stuart's successive petition, he is being detained at the Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution in Boise, Idaho. (ki34198, R., p.9.) Clearly, only the court 
in Ada County had jurisdiction to hear any claims that are part of a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that Stuart's appeal be dismissed or, alternatively, 
that the decision of the trial court be affirmed on appeal. 
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